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Abstract. Using copulas to model the stochastic dependence of values, this paper es-
tablishes new general conditions on the profitability of product bundling. A multiproduct
monopolist generally achieves higher profit from mixed bundling than from separate selling
if consumer values for two products are negatively dependent, independent, or have limited
positive dependence. With more than two goods, the same conditions are suﬃcient for
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1. INTRODUCTION
When is product bundling more profitable than separate selling? The question has long
intrigued economists. Stigler (1963) showed with a simple example that bundling can be
profitable even without demand complementarities or scope economies. Adams and Yellen
(1976) expanded on this view, showing, mostly with examples, that mixed bundling can be a
profitable way to segment markets. Schmalensee (1984) studied the profitability of bundling
when consumer values for two goods have a bivariate normal distribution, and found for
the symmetric case suﬃcient conditions on the marginal distribution for pure bundling to
dominate separate selling for any degree of correlation short of perfect positive correlation.
Working with an arbitrary bivariate distribution having a continuous density function, Long
(1984) found bundling to be profitable when consumer values are negatively dependent
or independent. McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) relaxed the assumption of a
continuous density function to develop a general suﬃcient condition for the profitability of
bundling, albeit one that apparently is diﬃcult to interpret in terms of dependence relations
beyond saying bundling is optimal in a broader range of cases than just independence. Chu,
Leslie, and Sorensen (2011) showed with numerical analyses that bundling is profitable in an
array of special cases, including some featuring limited positive and negative dependence.
Although considerable attention has been directed at how the correlation of values for
products matters for the profitability of bundling, the issue remains generally unclear, not
only for positively dependent distributions, but also for negatively dependent distributions
that are not absolutely continuous. We revisit the profitability of bundling with a new
approach that uses a copula to represent the distribution of consumer values. A copula is a
function that couples marginal distributions of random variables to form a joint distribution,
making it straightforward to vary dependence while holding marginal distributions constant
(Nelsen, 2006). Under general distributions of consumer preferences, and without assuming
continuous joint densities, we show that bundling is more profitable than separate selling
for a two-product monopolist if consumer values for two products are negatively dependent,
independent, or have limited positive dependence.
We then extend the two- product monopoly model in two directions. First, we consider
a multiproduct monopolist selling any number of goods. If consumer values for at least
two of the goods possess one of the aforementioned dependence properties, then some form
of bundling, e.g. selling two of the goods in a bundle as well as on a standalone basis, is
more profitable than separate selling. We also consider situations in which a multiproduct
firm competes against a single-product rival, with the multiproduct firm producing two
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distinct products, and the single-product competitor producing a diﬀerentiated version of
one of them. Under similar dependence conditions as for a multiproduct monopoly, the
multiproduct firm optimally chooses bundling in equilibrium, regardless of the dependence
relationship between the two diﬀerentiated versions of the product that both firms produce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic model of a monopoly
producing two goods, and introduces the copula approach to representing the joint distrib-
ution of consumer values for the goods that determines demand. Section 3 establishes a key
lemma that provides a general suﬃcient condition for the profitability of monopoly bundling.
The lemma focuses squarely on the properties of the copula, and is employed in subsequent
sections in various ways. Section 4 extends Long (1984) by showing product bundling is
generally profitable when the distribution of consumer values are negatively dependent or
independent even if the joint density function is not continuous. We also illustrate the re-
sult and its limits with a parameterized family of copulas. Section 5 introduces a bound on
stochastic dependence that depends only on marginal distributions to show that bundling
is profitable for any copula exhibiting a limited degree of positive dependence. Section 6
extends these results to a multiproduct monopoly selling any number of goods, and Section
7 to markets where a multiproduct firm competes against a diﬀerentiated single-product
rival. Section 8 concludes with directions for further research.
2. BASIC MONOPOLY MODEL
Our model of product bundling by a monopolist hews closely to the basic framework of
Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984), Long (1984) and McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston (1989). There are two goods, X and Y. The size of consumer
population is normalized to 1. Each consumer demands at most one unit of each good, and
her consumption of one does not aﬀect her demand for the other. A consumer’s value for X
is  and for Y is  with marginal distributions  () and  () on respective supports [ ¯]
and [ ¯]  with corresponding density functions  ()  0 and  ()  0 on ( ¯) and ( ¯)
for −∞ ≤   ¯ ≤ ∞ and −∞ ≤   ¯ ≤ ∞. The value of the outside option is normalized
to zero. The constant marginal costs for X and Y are  and   respectively. The value
of two goods together is +  with marginal cost  + ; thus this framework rules out
product complementarity or economies of scale as explanations for bundling. Resale is not
possible, and the firm cannot prevent consumers from purchasing both X and Y separately.1
1McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) also study the "monitoring case" with no resale, for which
the firm can prevent consumers from purchasing both goods separately, and for which they conclude that
bundling generally is profitable.
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A benchmark for evaluating the profitability of bundling is the profit from simple monopoly
pricing when the two goods are sold separately. A consumer can be represented by a point
( ) ∈ 2 with values () = −1() and () = −1() for the two goods. If X and
Y are sold separately at prices  and , consumers will purchase X if  () ≥  or equiv-
alently  ≥  (), and will purchase Y if  ≥  ()  Therefore, monopoly prices for X
and Y under separate selling respectively satisfy  ∈ argmax {(−)[1−  ()]} and
 ∈ argmax {( − )[1−()]}. Following McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989),
we assume interior solutions under separate selling:2
Assumption 1  and  satisfy the first-order conditions
1−  ()− ( −)  () = 0 (1)
1− ()− ( − )  () = 0 (2)
with 0   ()  0 and 0   ()  1.
For any given () and (),  and  are given, as are  ≡  () and  ≡  ().
For given ()  we shall call any () for which Assumption 1 holds admissible.3
Interpreting ( ) ∈ 2 as a consumer type, the population of consumers is described
by a copula ( ). A copula is a bivariate uniform distribution that “couples” arbitrary
marginal distributions to form a new joint distribution. Standard uniform margins for  and
 imply ( 1) =  and (1 ) = . A copula additionally satisfies ( 0) = 0 = (0 ).
By Sklar’s Theorem, it is without loss of generality to represent the joint distribution of
consumer values for the two products by a copula and the marginal distributions.4 Let
 =  () and  =  (), and denote the copula associated with the joint distribution
of ( ) by ( ) Then the joint distribution of ( ) is ( ()()). The partial
derivatives, 1( ) ≡ ( ) and 2( ) ≡ ( ), exist almost everywhere.
Furthermore, 1( ) is the conditional distribution of  given , and 2( ) is the con-
ditional distribution of  given  (Nelsen, 2006). The main departure of our approach
from the previous literature on bundling is to use a copula to describe the population of
consumers.5
2 If  and  are not too much above the marginal costs, then  and  will be interior values satisfying
(1) and (2) below.
3The marginal costs can be normalized to zero without loss of generality. With this normalization,  and
 are interpreted as consumer values net of marginal costs, and , , and  are interpreted as markups.
4Sklar’s Theorm holds also for more than two values, where any joint distribution can be represented by
marginal distributions and a multivariate copula (Nelsen, 2006). We will use this to generalize our results
to  ≥ 2 products and to bundling under competition.
5An exception is Chu, Leslie, and Sorenson (2011) who use a Gaussian copula to model limited correlation
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Under bundling, X and Y are sold individually at prices  and , respectively, and the XY
bundle is sold at price  ≤ + . Pure bundling is a degenerate case in which  and  are
high enough to choke oﬀ the standalone sales, while mixed bundling admits both bundled
and separate sales. Consumers are willing to purchase the bundle if () + () −  ≥
max {0 ()−  ()− }, X alone if () −  ≥ 0 and () ≤  − , and Y alone if
()−  ≥ 0 and () ≤ − . Consequently, demands for each good and the bundle at an
interior solution are, respectively: 6
( ) ≡ ( − )− ( () ( − )); (3)
 ( ) ≡  ( − )− ( ( − ) ()); (4)
 (  ) ≡ R  () (−) [1− 1(( − ())] + [1−  ()]−( ) (5)
Therefore, the profit function under mixed bundling is
 (  ) = (−) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − − ) (  )  (6)
The multiproduct monopolist chooses (  ) to maximize profit subject to  ≤  + 
Bundling has higher profit than separate selling if   +  at the solution. If  = + ,
then profit is the same as under separate selling.
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Our approach to finding a suﬃcient condition for the profitability of bundling is similar to
Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989). Starting at monopoly pricing
under separate selling, the analysis asks whether it is profitable to discount the bundle by
a small amount.7 Thus consider the profit function
 () ≡  (   +  − )
for diﬀerent marginal distribution functions.
6Allowance for corner solutions, in which demand for any of the three options is zero, is a straightforword
extension of these formulas. Riemann integrability of 1(( − ()) in the formula for  requires
continuity almost everywhere, as in the cases of positive or negative dependence examined below.
7McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) also considered raising one of the standalone prices by a small
amount, which yields an equivalent condition for profitability. Long (1984) proved his result by interpreting
mixed bundling as a two-part tariﬀ and deriving conditions under which it is profitable to raise the fixed
fee above zero. This is equivalent to raising the standalone prices and the bundle price all by , which also
yields an equivalent condition.
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for  ≥ 0. If  ()   (0) for some small positive , then some form of bundling must
be profitable compared to separate selling. If  (  ) is diﬀerentiable at (   + ),
then 0 (0)  0 is a suﬃcient condition.
The following lemma is proved by relating the sign of 0(0) to the properties of the copula.
Indeed, 0(0) has the same sign as
∆ ( ) ≡ (1− ) [1− 1 ( )] + (1− ) [1− 2 ( )]− ¯( ) (7)
where
¯( ) ≡ 1− −  +  ( ) 
¯( ) is the joint survival function for two standard uniform random variables whose joint
distribution is ( ), i.e., the probability that a consumer’s values for X and Y are above
() and () respectively (Nelsen, 2006). The lemma provides a general suﬃcient indicator
for the profitability of product bundling in terms of the dependence of consumer values as
summarized by the copula.
Lemma 1 (a) For any given admissible ()  bundling has a higher profit than separate
selling if ∆ ( )  0.8 (b) If ∆ ( )  0 for (almost) all ( ) ∈ int 2, then bundling
has a higher profit than separate selling for (almost) all admissible ().
Proof. (a) Mixed bundling is more profitable than separate selling if 0 (0)  0 We have
0(0) = − ( −)  (
  + )
 − (
 − )  (
  + )

− ( +  − − )  (
   + )
 − (
   + ) 
From (3), (4), and (5), simple diﬀerentiation and substitution yield:
0(0) = ( −)  () [1− 1 ( ()   ())] + ( −)  () [1− 2 ( ()   ())]
− [1−  ()− () +  ( ()   ())] 
Using first order conditions (1) and (2), and substituting  =  () and  =  (), we
obtain 0 (0) = ∆ ( ) 
(b) ∆ ( ) exists almost everywhere on int 2. Therefore, if ∆ ( )  0 almost every-
where, then bundling necessarily is profitable for almost all admissible (). Furthermore,
8∆( )  0 implicitly requires 1( ) and 2 ( ) to exist at ( ) which is almost surely satisfied
( ) is diﬀerentiable almoste everywhere (Nelsen, 2006) . McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) take
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Fig. 1. Monopoly Mixed Bundling with a Small Discount for the Bundle
if ∆ ( )  0 everywhere on int 2, then bundling must be profitable for all admissible
().
Lemma 1 provides an elegant, powerful, and useful condition for the profitability of
bundling: assuming an interior solution to the monopoly separate-pricing problem, a suﬃ-
cient condition for profitable bundling is stated only in terms of the copula; the condition
dispenses with a joint density function, and is a suﬃcient condition for the profitability of
bundling for all admissible marginal distributions rather than just for a given joint prob-
ability distribution; and the condition can be verified numerically for a given copula by
evaluating an indicator function on the unit square.
Lemma 1(a) is analogous to McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989)’s general suﬃcient
condition for profitable bundling (Proposition 1), but uses the copula to describe consumer
preferences while also relaxing technical conditions. Some intuition is gained from Fig.
1, which maps McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989)’s Figure III to the consumer type
space (2). The condition ∆( )  0 weighs two eﬀects of a vanishingly small  discount
of the XY bundle relative to separate pricing. The negative first-order eﬀect of an  discount
is to lower the price to those consumers purchasing both products under separate pricing,
corresponding to area abe in the figure and to the joint survival term −¯( ) in the
definition of ∆( ). The positive eﬀect is to cause some consumers purchasing a single
product under separate pricing to purchase the bundle instead, corresponding to area bcde
and aefg and to the remaining terms of ∆( ). The lemma states a general condition for
the positive eﬀect to outweigh the negative eﬀect as  goes to zero.
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4. NEGATIVE DEPENDENCE
We show that a multiproduct monopolist generally achieves higher profit from bundling
than from separate selling under negative dependence or independence. Stigler (1963) and
Adams and Yellen (1976) found by various examples that bundling can be more profitable
than separate selling when values for products are negatively dependent. While the intuition
from these studies seem to suggest that bundling generally is profitable under negative
dependence, the precise conditions for such a conclusion are subtle and remain unsettled.
Long (1984) showed that bundling is profitable if the distribution of consumer values has a
continuous density and is negatively dependent in a particular way, while without assuming
a continuous density McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) did not reach the same strong
conclusion.9
Long (1984) derived the profitability of bundling under negative dependence by inter-
preting bundling as a two-part pricing scheme and analyzing demand elasticities. The
copula approach provides an alternative statement and extension of Long (1984)’s result.
The particular dependence condition identified by Long (1984) is the following:
Pr{  |  } is nonincreasing in  and Pr{  |  } is nonincreasing in .
In the language of modern statistics,  is right tail decreasing in , and  is right tail
decreasing in  (Nelsen 2006). Furthermore, if  and  are continuous random variables
with a copula ( ), then these two properties are equivalent respectively to the two
conditions in the following definition (Nelsen, 2006):
Definition 1 ( ) is right tail decreasing (RTD) at ( ) ∈ 2 if
1( ) ≤  −( )
1−   and 2( ) ≤
− ( )
1−   (8)
The following proposition extends the negative dependence result in Long (1984), replac-
ing the assumption of a continuous density of consumer values with the following weaker
condition on the copula at  =  and  = :
( )  1 for at least one   = 1 2 (9)
9McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) (pp. 379-380) argued informally that their suﬃcient condition
for profitable bundling (Proposition 1) is satisfied if the monopoly price for good Y conditional on knowing
the consumer reservation value for good X is decreasing in the value of good X, but concluded that this
"cannot be tied solely to the correlation of reservation values."
7
The result expresses negative dependence as a property of the copula.
Proposition 1 For any admissible ()  bundling is profitable if ( ) is right tail
decreasing and (9) holds at ( ).
Proof. Under right tail decreasing:
∆( ) ≡ (1− ) [1− 1 ( )] + (1− ) [1− 2 ( )]− ¯ ( )
= 1− ( )− (1− )1 ( )− (1− )2 ( )
≥ 1− ( )− (1− ) 
 −  ( )
(1− ) − (1− 
) 
 −  ( )
(1− )
= 1− ( )−  +  ( )−  + ( )
= 1−  −  +  ( ) ≡ ¯ ( ) ≥ 0
If ¯ ( )  0, then ∆( )  0. If ¯ ( ) = 0, then
∆( ) = (1− ) [1− 1( )] + (1− ) [1− 2( )]  0
by condition (9). In either case the result is immediate from Lemma 1(a).
Notice that Proposition 1 applies to  ( ) = , i.e., bundling is profitable if consumer
values for the two goods are independent.
From Lemma 2 (b) and Proposition 1, we immediately have the following generic condition
on the profitability of bundling under negative dependence, which takes into account the
fact that  ( ) might fail to exist on ( ) ∈ 2 only on a set of zero measure
Corollary 1 If ( ) is right tail decreasing and (9) holds for (almost) all ( ) ∈ int
2 then bundling is profitable for (almost) all admissible ().
If ( ) is right tail decreasing at any ( ) ∈ int 2, then condition (9) is satisfied if
¯ ( )  010 The property ¯ ( )  0 for ( ) ∈ int 2 means that some consumers
purchase both goods for any interior solution of the independent pricing problem, and is
satisfied if  ( ) has positive support as → 1 and  → 1 from below. While this clearly
holds if  ( ) has full support on 2, as implicitly assumed by Long (1984), it is useful
to have a more general statement of the negative tail dependence result, because many
standard copula families do not have full support (Nelsen 2006).
10To see this, suppose to the contrary that ¯( )  0 but 1( ) = 1Then,by negative right tail
dependence, 1 = 1 ( ) ≤ −()1−  or 1− −  +  ( ) = ¯ ( ) ≤ 0which is a contradiction.
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To illustrate our results under negative dependence and gain additional insights, consider
the following example:
Example 1 Let
 ( ;) = max {+  − 1 0}+ (1− ) where  ∈ [0 1] 
This defines a family of copulas parameterized by  combining two familiar copulas corre-
sponding to perfect negative dependence and independence.11 The entire family of copulas,
( ;), lacks continuous densities except when  = 0 For all  ∈ [0 1):
1 ( ;) =
(
+ (1− )   1  +  − 1  0
(1− )   1  +  − 1  0 ;
2 ( ;) =
( + (1− )  1  +  − 1  0
(1− )  1  +  − 1  0 
and both 1 ( ;) ≤ −()1− and 2 ( ;) ≤ −()1− are satisfied when +−1 6= 0
because
 −  ( ;)
1−  =
(





  +  − 1  0 
−  ( ;)
1−  =
(





  +  − 1  0 
Therefore, with  ∈ [0 1)  ( ;) is right tail decreasing and (9) holds for almost all
( ) ∈ int 2. It follows from Corollary 1 that bundling is profitable for almost all admis-
sible (). Only for () with  +  − 1 = 0 does Proposition 1 (or Corollary 1) not
determine the profitability of bundling.
Suppose for instance that  () =  () =  on [0 1] and  ∈ [0 1) Then, under
separate selling, the firm’s optimal prices are
 () = 1 +
2
=  ∈ [1
2
 1);  () = 1 +
2
=  ∈ [1
2
 1)
and, for all  ∈ (0 1), both () are admissible and  +  − 1 6= 0 Therefore,
11A useful result in the theory of copulas is that a convex linear combination of two copulas is a copula
(Nelsen, 2006).
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from Proposition 1, bundling is profitable for all joint distributions of consumer values
corresponding to  ( ;) with  ∈ [0 1) and with  () =  () =  for  ∈ (0 1)
When  = 1  ( ; 1) corresponds to the “Hotelling case" of perfect negative dependence:
 ( ; 1) = max {+  − 1 0} 
where 1 ( ) = 1 = 2 ( ) for all  +  − 1  0 Then condition (9) does not hold.
Under separate selling, if  =  ≡  then maximum profit from the two products is
 = 2 ¡1−2 ¢2  Under bundling, the optimal pricing strategy is pure bundling with ∗ = 1,
which fully extracts consumer surplus.12 So the maximum profit under bundling is  =
1− 2 Hence









1− 2−2¢ T 0 if  S √2− 1 ≈ 0414 21
Therefore bundling is profitable in the Hotelling case if and only if   √2− 1
Several interesting points emerge from Example 1. First, the profitability of bundling
under negative dependence applies to a much larger set of distributions of consumer values
than identified in the previous literature. Second, the suﬃcient condition in our result,
which is easy to check, is fairly tight. When it is violated, as is in the Hotelling case,
it becomes possible that bundling is not profitable. Third, while from the intuition of
Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen (1976), and Long (1984) one might expect more negative
dependence to make bundling more profitable, this is not true generally. In Example 1, with
 () =  () =  and  ∈ (0 1) bundling always is more profitable than separate
selling except for  = 1 the case perfect negative dependence, for which bundling is not
profitable if  ≥ √2− 1
We conclude this section by discussing a somewhat stronger negative dependence prop-
erty. Value  () is stochastically decreasing in  () if the conditional distribution of  ()
is nondecreasing in  (). These stochastic monotonicity conditions are equivalent to the
conditions of the following definition (Nelsen, 2006):
Definition 2 ( ) is negatively stochastic dependent at ( ) ∈ 2 if 1( ) is nonde-
creasing in  and 2( ) is nondecreasing in .
Negative stochastic dependence for ( ) ∈ 2 implies negative right tail dependence
12As in the Hotelling model of product diﬀerentiation, consumer preferences can be represented as a
uniform distribution of locations on the unit line. The Hotelling case for the bundling model is similar to
the negative dependence examples of Stigler (1963) and Adams and Yellen (1976).
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(Nelsen, 2006), and, together with condition (9), is thus also generally suﬃcient for the
profitability of bundling.
Strict negative dependence (i.e. ( ) strictly convex in  and in ) implies an even
stronger conclusion about the profitability of bundling. Armstrong (2010) considers the
case of independent firms selling X and Y separately, and shows that, starting from separate
monopoly prices, with strict negative stochastic dependence, at least one of the two firms
has an incentive to oﬀer a discount to consumers buying the other product. Indeed, in our
setting, the firm selling Y has an incentive to oﬀer a small   0 discount to consumers
buying X if
∆ ( )− (1− ) [1−1 ( )]
= (1− ) [1−2 ( )]− ¯ ( )
= ( 1)− ( )− (1− )2 ( )  0 (10)
which follows from the strict convexity of ( ) in . The graphical interpretation in Fig.
1 helps explain this result: condition (10) states that bcde alone exceeds area abe. In other
words, with strict negative stochastic dependence, the gain from increased sales of only one
of the two products alone outweighs the cost of the discount on the bundle.
5. POSITIVE DEPENDENCE
Less is known about positive dependence. Since bundling is strictly more profitable for
the independence copula ( ) =  and any admissible marginal distributions, the same
must be true for copulas that are "close" to the independence copula. Therefore, as observed
by McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), bundling is optimal in the neighborhood of
the independence case. Schmalensee (1984) showed for the symmetric bivariate normal case
that bundling is always profitable if demand under separate selling is suﬃciently strong
(i.e. in our framework if  =  is suﬃciently small) except in the case of perfect positive
correlation, for which bundling never has an advantage over separate selling.13 Beyond
Schmalensee (1984)’s bivariate normal results, it remains an open question whether bundling
dominates separate selling for any degree of positive dependence short of perfect.
Our main result here is that bundling is profitable if positive stochastic dependence is not
13With perfect positive dependence, any feasible mixed bundling scheme is equivalent to a separate selling
scheme. This follows from the fact that with perfect positive dependence mixed bundling can have positive
standalone sales of only one of the two goods, implying that mixed bundling is equivalent to separately
selling one good at  and the other at  − . Consequently, mixed bundling and separate selling have the
same outcomes.
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too great. The result puts a bound on the degree of positive stochastic dependence that
assures profitable bundling. Value  is stochastically increasing in  if Pr {  |} is non-
decreasing in ; similarly,  is stochastically increasing in  if Pr {  |} is nondecreasing
in . These properties are equivalent to the following definition (Nelsen, 2006):
Definition 3 ( ) is positively stochastic dependent at ( ) ∈ 2 if 1( ) is nonin-
creasing in  and 2( ) is nonincreasing in 
Given this definition, it is natural to measure the degree of positive stochastic dependence
by how negative are 11( ) ≡ 2()2 and 22( ) ≡ 
2()
2 , because these second
derivatives determine the degree of concavity of  ( ) in  and in .14 Furthermore, if
( ) is positively stochastic dependent on the interior of 2, then these second derivatives
exist almost everywhere.
Positive stochastic dependence for ( ) ∈ 2 implies positive right-tail dependence, and
both in turn imply positive quadrant dependence (Nelsen, 2006):
Definition 4 ( ) is positively quadrant dependent at ( ) ∈ 2 if  ( ) ≥ .
Positive quadrant dependence is used in the proof of the following proposition. The result
says that bundling is profitable under positive dependence if  ( ) are not too negative on
the boundaries of the set of consumer types purchasing both goods under separate pricing.
Proposition 2 For any given admissible ()  define the constant
 ≡ 2 (1− 
) (1− )
(1− )2 + (1− )2  0 (11)
If ( ) is positively quadrant dependent at ( ), and
min {11( ) 22 ( ))| ≥   ≥ }  − (12)
then bundling is more profitable than separate selling.
14For many parameterized copula families,  decreases in a parameter that indexes the range of positive
dependence. This is true, for example, for the FGM, Clayton and Frank copula families discussed later.
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Proof. For any given admissible (),









11 ( ) 
= 1−  −  +  ( ) +
Z 1

2 ( ) 





11 ( ) 











22 ( ) 
Furthermore,  ( ) ≥  implies
1−  −  + ( ) ≥ (1− ) (1− ) ; (13)
and min {11 22}  − further implies










11 ( ) 








2 (1− ) (1− )
(1− )2 + (1− )2 = 0
Note that the bound  is independent of  ( ) and reaches a maximum of 1 when  = .
Thus, for all admissible marginal distributions, there is some range of positive dependence
for which bundling is profitable. This range is larger when market shares under separate
pricing are closer together. The result goes substantially beyond McAfee, McMillan, and
Whinston (1989)’s observation that bundling is profitable in the neighborhood of indepen-
dence.
To illustrate the substantial ranges of positive dependence allowed by (12), consider an
example where the copula belongs to the Fairlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) family:
( ; ) =  [1 + (1− )(1− )] 
where  ∈ [−1 1]  Notice that ( ; ) is positively (or negatively) dependent if   0 (or
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  0) and ( ; ) decreases in . For  ≤ 0 bundling is profitable from Proposition
1. Now consider positive dependence. It follows from 11 = −2 (1− ) that 11  −
if and only if
1−   
h
 (1− )2 +  (1− )2
i

which holds for all  ≤ 1 if
1−  −  (1− )2 −  (1− )2  0
which in turn holds if  =  or if max{ } ≤ 56; and similarly for 22 In other
words, for all admissible marginal distributions with  () =  () or with  () ≤ 56
and  () ≤ 56 the degrees of positive dependence for all FGM family copulas fall below
the bound given in (12). For any such admissible ()  bundling is profitable for any
member of the FGM copula family.15
The FGM copula family exhibits a limited range of negative and positive dependence, and
 = 1 does not correspond to perfect positive dependence. For distributions with higher
degrees of positive dependence short of perfect dependence, it is easy to check Lemma 1
(b)’s condition for the profitability of bundling numerically. Consider, for instance, the
Frank copula family
 ( ; ) = −1 ln
Ã
1 +
¡− − 1¢ ¡− − 1¢
(− − 1)
!
for  ∈ (−∞∞) 0
and the Clayton copula family
 ( ; ) = max
½h
− + − − 1
i−1  0¾ for  ∈ [−1∞)0
Both a Frank copula and a Clayton copula exhibit positive stochastic dependence if   0
and  =∞ corresponds to perfect dependence. For both copula families, numerical analysis
shows that ∆( )  0 for ( ) ∈ int 2. Therefore, from Lemma 1(b), bundling appears
to be profitable for all Frank and Clayton copulas for any admissible marginal distributions.
Referring back to Fig. 1, for positively dependent Frank and Clayton copulas, the gains
15 In fact, for all ( ) ∈ Int 2 it is easy to show
∆ ( ) = (1− ) (1− ) (3 −  −  + 1)  0
From Lemma 1(b) we conclude that bundling is always profitable for all admissible () and for all members
of the FGM copula family.
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from consumers in (bcde + aefg) always exceed the loss from consumers in abe.16 This
again shows the power of the copula approach and Lemma 1(b): instead of checking all joint
distributions that can be formed by these copulas and all admissible ()  which would
be virtually impossible to do numerically, all we need is to compute ∆( ) on ( ) ∈ 2
which is solely determined by the copula function.
So far, we have not found a counterexample of the profitability of bundling under positive
dependence outside the limiting case of perfect positive dependence.
6. ANY NUMBER OF GOODS
The profitability conditions for bundling by a monopolist with two goods can be extended
to any number of products. To proceed, we generalize the model in Section 2 to any  ≥ 2
products: X1 ..., X17 Let  denote the consumer value for X,  () the marginal
distribution of values,  the marginal cost, and  the single product monopoly price. As
with  = 2,  is assumed to be an interior solution of the profit maximization problem,
and satisfies
1−  ( )− ( −)  ( ) = 0
Let ˜ (1 ) denote the multivariate copula describing joint distribution of  =  ()
for  = 1 . By Sklar’s Theorem, the joint distribution of consumer values for the 
goods is therefore ˜ (1 (1)    ()). Assume that the value of two goods X and X
together is +  with constant marginal cost +  and the values and marginal costs
are similarly obtained for  goods together,  ≤ . Again, this framework rules out product
complementarity or economies of scale as explanations for bundling.
Our previous results on the profitability of bundling for the two-good monopolist extend
readily to the  good case. Consider the profitability of selling a two-good bundle {X1X2}
together with individually-priced goods X1 X. Suppose the prices for goods X3 X
are set at  =    = 3  , so the profits from the sale of these ( − 2) goods is by
hypothesis the same as from separate selling. It then suﬃces to show that profit from
goods X1 and X2 will be higher under the proposed bundling than under separate selling.
Notice that the joint distribution of consumer values for X1 and X2 can be represented
16Both copula families also allow independence and the full range of negative dependence, but these cases
are covered by Corollary 1.
17 In reality, a firm sometimes sells multiple groups of products, and goods within each product group
could be substitutes such that a consumer may purchase only one of them. For ease of exposition, we do
not explicitly model this situation, but we can accommodate this possibility by allowing the interpretation
of X if appropriate, as any (symmetric) good from product group   = 1   where goods within group
 are substitutes
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by  (1 (1)  2 (2))  where  ( ) ≡ ˜ (  1  1) is a bivariate copula Therefore,
Lemma 1 applies, and under the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, profits from X1 and
X2 are higher under mixed bundling than under separate selling. Hence:
Corollary 2 For a multiproduct monopolist selling  ≥ 2 products, if consumer values for
at least two goods are negatively dependent, independent, or have limited positive dependence,
then some form of bundling will have higher profits than separate selling.
7. PARTIAL COMPETITION
The profitability of bundling under multiproduct monopoly also extends to markets where
a multiproduct firm competes against a single-product firm. We focus on the case where
the multiproduct firm,  oﬀers two products X and Y, whereas a single-product firm, 
oﬀers a symmetrically diﬀerentiated version of product Y, Y. The two firms compete by
simultaneously choosing prices, where for firm A the prices can either be those under sepa-
rate selling or those under mixed bundling. We assume a pure strategy equilibrium exists
for this model of price competition, and consider whether in equilibrium the multiproduct
firm has higher profits from bundling than from separate selling.
A consumer’s value for  is (), and for Y is () with (  ) ∈ 3. Therefore, the
marginal distribution of consumer values for X is  (), and the symmetric distribution for
each variety of product Y is () with corresponding density functions ()  0 and () 
0 on their respective supports. The copula (  ), with  and  exchangeable,
describes the population of consumers. Adopting stochastic monotonicity dependence
concepts, and assuming diﬀerentiability, we say that values for X and Y are positively
dependent, independent, or negatively dependent when respectively 11(  ) ≤ 0
11(  ) = 0 or 11(  ) ≥ 0 for almost all (  ) ∈ 3.
Under mixed bundling, let  denote the standalone price of X,  the standalone price
of Y for  ∈ {}, and  ≤  +  the price of Firm A’s bundle. Separate pricing is
equivalent to  = + , in which case the demands for X and Y are respectively
 () = 1−  () 
 ( ) = 1−  (1 ()  ())−
R 1
()3 (1  ( + ()− )  ) 
The marginal costs for products X and Y are  and  , and interior equilibrium prices
 and  in the two product markets satisfy





[1−  (1  ()   ())] (15)
= ( − )
h
2 (1  ()   ()) () + R 1()23 (1  ) (())i
respectively. See Chen and Riordan (2010) for details on symmetric equilibrium in the Y
market.
Return to mixed bundling, consumers will purchase the bundle if
() + ()−  ≥ max {0 ()− } 
() + ()−  ≥ ()− +max {0 ()− } 
() + ()−  ≥ ()− 
or, equivalently,
 ≥  ( − () + max {0 ()− }) 
 ≥  ( − +max {0 ()− }) 
 ≥  ( − ) 
Consumers will purchase X as a standalone product, rather than as part of the bundle, if
 ≥  () 
   ( − +max {0 ()− }) ;
and Y as a standalone product if
   ( − ) 
 ≥  ( +max {0 ()− }) 
To evaluate the demand for the products oﬀered by Firm A, consider a type (  )
consumer who is willing to purchase good X at price , i.e.  ≥  (). This consumer also
has the opportunity to acquire good Y as part of the bundle by paying an incremental price
 − , or to purchase Y at price . The consumer’s choice in the Y market depends on
( ) as illustrated in the unit square of Fig. 2. Consumers in region XY purchase the
bundle, those in in region XY separately purchase X and Y, and those in region X only










Fig. 2. Demand in Market Y for Consumers Willing to Buy X
union of regions XY and X. The following demand function aggregates these consumer
for all  ≥  ():
 (  ) (16)
=  (1  ( − )   ())− ( ()   ( − )  ())
+
R 1
() [3 (1  ( − + ()− )  )− 3 ( ()   ( − + ()− )  )] 
Similarly, the standalone demand for Y
 (  ) (17)
=  ( ( − )  1 ())− ( ( − )   ()   ())
+
R 1
() [3 ( ( − )  1 )−3 ( ( − )   ( + ()− )  )] 
and the demand for the bundle is
 (   ) (18)
= 1−  ()− (  )
+
R  ()





() [13 ( 1 )− 13 ( ( − () + ()− )  )] 
The demand for Y is analogous to the demand for Y.
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With no economies of scope, the profit of Firm A is
 (   ) = (−) (  ) + ( − ) (  )
+ ( − − ) (   ) 
We now extend the profitability of bundling under multiproduct monopoly to this partial
competition model, by establishing that in equilibrium the multiproduct firm will optimally
choose bundling if values for X and Y are negatively dependent, independent, or have
suﬃciently limited positive dependence.
Proposition 3 Let
¯ ≡ ( − )  () [2 (1  ()   ())− 2 ( ()   ()   ())]  0 (19)
In equilibrium, bundling is more profitable for the multiproduct firm than separate selling if
11  −4¯.
Proof. See the appendix.
Thus a multiproduct firm facing a single product competitor will optimally choose bundling
in equilibrium for a range of dependence conditions, similarly to a multiproduct monopolist.
The main contrast with Proposition 1 is that Proposition 3 employs a stronger negative
dependence property, and the main contrast with Proposition 2 is that the bound on the
degree of positive dependence in Proposition 3 depends on the copula.18 Nevertheless, the
results are the same for negative dependence and independence. A strength of Proposition
3 is that it allows any dependence relation between Y and Y
We have confined our analysis of bundling under competition to situations where a multi-
product firm competes with a single-product rival. The profitability of bundling is relatively
simple in this case, because only the multiproduct firm can choose to bundle its products. In
markets where the competition is between multiproduct firms, the issue of bundling is more
complex, since the profitability of bundling by one firm may depend on whether or not the
other firm bundles. The issue also is more complex because there are dependence relations
both between values for diﬀerent products and between values for products by diﬀerent
firms. We leave it for future research to address the issue of equilibrium product bundling
by competing multiproduct firms under general preference dependence conditions.19
18With (minor) additional restrictions, it’s possible to find a lower bound on 11 that is a fixed number.
For instance, if  ,  (·)  and 123 (·) are all bound above zero, then ¯ is bound above zero and the lower
bound on 11 in Proposition 3 can be stated as 11 ≥ −¯ for some fixed ¯  0.
19As McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) observed, under competition between multiproduct firms,
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8. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that a multiproduct firm achieves higher profit from mixed bundling
than from separate selling if consumer values for two products are negatively dependent,
independent, or have limited positive dependence. When the firm sells more than two
products, profit is higher under bundling if values for at least two of the goods possess
one of these dependence properties. Furthermore, the profitability of monopoly bundling
extends to markets where a multiproduct firm competes against a single-product rival.
There are several directions for future research. For instance, while monopoly bundling
often increases the firm’s profit, its eﬀects on consumer and social welfare are less clear. It
would be desirable to find general conditions with which the consumer and welfare eﬀects
of monopoly bundling can be evaluated. Stigler (1963) and our Example 1 show that
consumers may be worse oﬀ with bundling, but it is unclear how robust is this possibility.
It would also be interesting to further study the incentives for and eﬀects of bundling under
competition. For instance, according to the existing literature, whereas bundling can be
an eﬀective entry barrier, it sometimes may also be entry-accommodating by creating (or
increasing) product diﬀerentiation. It would be desirable to develop an understanding of
when bundling forecloses competition and when it softens competition in a more general
framework of preference dependence.20
if consumer values for all goods are independently distributed, then a firm will find it optimal to engage in
mixed bundling if the other firm does not, so that it cannot be an equilibrium for all firms to choose separate
selling.
20The foreclosure theory of bundling was first formalized in Whinston (1990). Other contributions on
the foreclosure eﬀects of bundling include Carlton and Waldman (2002), Choi and Stefanadis (2001), and
Nalebuﬀ (2004). Our result here shows that even without the foreclosure motive, a multiproduct firm can
often profit from bundling its products in competing with a single-product rival. With competition between
multiproduct firms, firms may also choose to oﬀer (diﬀerent) bundles in order to create endogenous product
diﬀerentiation (Carbajo, De Meza, and Seidman, 1990; and Chen, 1997).
20
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3
We show that, under the conditions specified in the Proposition, at any equilibrium firm
A must choose bundling rather than separate selling; i.e., in equilibrium bundling must have
higher profit than separate selling for firm A. This would be true if separate selling cannot
be part of any equilibrium.
Let ( ) denote the prices of X and Y products in a separate-pricing equilibrium.
Then
¯ () ≡  ( +     + )
is Firm A’s profit from increasing the standalone price of X, while holding constant the
standalone prices of the Y product and the price of the bundle at  = +. Separate selling
cannot be part of any equilibrium if ¯0 (0)  0. Noticing that  (  )  = 0 we
have
¯0 (0) =  (
    + )

=  (   + ) + ( −)  (
∗ ∗ ∗ + ∗)

+( +  − − )  (
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ + ∗)

with
 (   + ) ≡ 1
2
[1−  ()] + 1
2
[ (1  ()   ())−  ( ()   ()   ())] 
 (   + )
 ≡ − [2 (1  (
)   ())− 2 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()
−1 ( ()  ()  ())  ()
−R 1() [23 (1  )− 23 ( ()   )]  ( ()) 
−R 1()13 ( ()   )  () 
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 (   + )
 ≡ − (
)−  (
   + )

+ [1 ( ()  1  ())− 1 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()
+
R 1
() [13 ( ()  1 )− 13 ( ()   )]  ()
= − () + [2 (1  ()   ())− 2 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()
+
R 1
() [23 (1  )−23 ( ()   )]  ( ())  + 1 ( ()  1 1)  () 
Therefore,
¯0 (0) =  (   + )
+ ( −)
( − () + [1 ( ()  1  ())− 1 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()
+
R 1
() [13 ( ()  1 2)− 13 ( ()  2 2)]  () 2
)
+( − )
( − () + [2 (1 ()  ())−2 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()+R 1
() [23 (1  )− 23 ( ()   )]  ( ())  + 1 ( ()  1 1)  ()
)
Substituting 1 ( ()  1 1) = 1 and 13 (1 2 2) = 12 1(122)2 , and simplifying, we have
¯0 (0) =  (   + )
+ ( −)
(
[1 ( ()  1  ())− 1 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()




[2 (1  ()   ())− 2 ( ()  ()  ())]  ()
+
R 1
() [23 (1  )− 23 ( ()   )]  ( ()) 
)
=  (   + ) + ( −)
(
−1 ( ()   ()   ())  ()−
1




[2 (1  ()   ())− 2 ( ()   ()   ())]  ()
+
R 1




Substituting for  (   + )  using ( −)  () = 1−  ()  and simplifying




[1 ( ()   ())− 1 ( ()  ()  ())] 
+( − )
(
[2 (1  ()   ())− 2 ( ()  ()  ())]  ()
+
R 1








11 ( ()   ()) + ¯
since
R 1
() [23 (1  )− 23 ( ()   )]  ( ())  ≥ 0 where
¯ = ( − )  () [2 (1  ()   ())−2 ( ()  ()  ())]  0
Thus, ¯0 (0)  0 if values for X and Y are negatively dependent (11 ≥ 0) or independent
(11 = 0) Now, suppose that values for X and Y are positively dependent but 11  −4¯
Then
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